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Introduction
A Rand report released just prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, addressed the difficulty defense planners had deciding how to position defense forces after the demise of the Soviet Union. Specifically, the study noted, "Changes . . . placed tremendous strain both on the machinery used for deliberative planning and on the policymakers who sought to strike a balance between strategy, forces, and resources." Cultural, political, and global realities existing today dictated the Army's need to "balance the RC as a strategic and operational force." 6 That balance may be unique to recent experience but historical research revealed the National Guard has more experience as an operational force than a strategic reserve. Cold War planning using the Guard as a strategic reserve instead of an operational force was the exception and not the rule. Under pressure from National Guard advocates, Congress sought to assert an operational role for the organized state militias since militias became the National Guard in 1903. 7 In effect, operationalization today is a return to tradition. It is also the culminating point in the National Guard's effort to maintain force structure and relevancy in a post Cold War world.
The Army's decision to operationalize the reserve seems like an extraordinary step. In retrospect, it is not. First, the very discussion Admiral Mullen alluded to is just starting to take place and the bipolar world's expectation of strategic and operational reserve forces may not meet today's requirements. Security planners have yet to revise post Cold War force and mission definitions. Until this discourse is complete, it was only natural for the Army to use its reserves to reduce stress on active component forces. Second, it is a mistake to assume the Army suddenly made the reserves operational or that the National Guard has never served in an operational manner. While the Army at times has resisted using the National Guard units; the Guard has a history of serving in an operational role. The Constitution specified that state based militias would serve as part of the country's main defense force. 8 Operationalization of the National
Guard is an extension of the policies Congress started under the National Militia Act of 1903. The
Army is only continuing these practices with its 2006 Army Posture Statement announcement.
Finally, historically the United States has been unprepared for major long-term conflicts. The nation also tends to decrease active component strength following hostilities. These precedents predict the same once significant combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan end. As such, equipping and training the National Guard for operational force capability potentially enhances its ability to perform future strategic and operational force functions.
Organizationally, all of the Army's reserve maneuver ground combat capability exists in the Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) belonging to the Army National Guard. 9 The BCT is the Army's ground maneuver force. The Army's decision to operationalize the National Guard suggests the nation no longer has a dedicated strategic ground combat reserve. There may be benefits as well as risks to this shift in force allocation. The imperative to put National Guard
BCTs on an operational footing indicates planners failed to find the right force balance. The result of these miscalculations will likely demand the Army National Guard BCTs provide operational ground combat capacity as well as strategic depth. While extraordinary in recent experience, these missions suit the Citizen-Solder tradition. Unfortunately, if history offers any guide, the Army National Guard will have to perform the additional tasks using the existing force structure.
Setting the Context The Struggle to Define Strategic Reserve
The nation lacks contemporary definitions of strategic and operational reserve. Without clarification, it will be difficult to ascertain whether the National Guard is capable of serving as a strategic reserve as well as providing an operational force. The Commission on the Guard and Reserves defines the strategic reserve as ". . . a pool of replacement manpower and capability to be employed in a large-scale conflict with a peer or near-peer military competitor . . ." Use of the reserves in an operational context-as in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM-defines the new paradigm. The Commission then goes on to say, "Policymakers must strike an appropriate and sustainable balance between the operational and strategic use of the reserve components that will be necessary to achieve national security objectives in a long war." 17 The Commission attempted to discuss the differences between operational and strategic reserves, yet admitted that initially all reserve component units would be in the operational force. 
Return to Tradition From State Militia to Federal Reserve
All the concern and discussion about the National Guard's shift from a strategic r to an operational force is somewhat out of place. The National Guard did not begin as a strategic 
Legislative Evolution of the National Guard into an Expeditionary Force
The struggle to redefine militia responsibilities in the modern era began almost Guardsmen to the overall effort in the World Wars was comparatively small. There were only 181,000 National Guardsmen available ar I. By the time of the armistice, 2,000,000 men served in the American Expeditionary Force and almost 3,900,000 were in the Army. 88 The numbers in World War II are even mo dramatic. The nation mobilized roughly 300,000 Guardsmen against a total troop strength of 10,420,000. 89 By sheer numbers, the Guard provided little strategic capacity. Prior to Korea, the 85 Taylor, 3-4.
Planning for Operational Capability and Strategic Depth
86 Doubler, 203. 87 Kreidberg and Henry, 186.
88 Ibid., [374] [375] 89 Doubler, 212, and Kreidberg and Henry, 706. nation used the Guard units in an operational capacity even though the Army often treated units and individuals like strategic reserves.
If the Army's treatment of National Guard units in the Second World War foresh a strategic role, the Korean War was the demarcation point. The Guard's ability to provide strategic depth and operational capability started to become fully evident during that conflict. The nation mobilized roughly one-third of the National Guard, including eight divisions, for Korea. 93 Ibid., [95] [96] Ibid., 97. 95 Taylor, 5. Once the Army National Guard achieve pacity, it will have to meet all of its budget request is the largest in history, senior officers "recognize the budget will come down
The Guard provides more than on budget. The cost savings will again play into force metrics. The Army historically loose troop strength following a war, but the Guard's size stays relatively constant. The stability of th Army National Guard's size plus the expected budgetary pressures means Guard will assum more responsibility once Army strength declines. Operationalization now provides a betterequipped and trained force later.
The challenge for the National Guard is not whether it can fulfill both operational and strategic roles. It has proven it can do 124 Brayton, 141. 
